University of Vermont

UVM ScholarWorks
University Libraries Faculty and Staff
Publications

University Libraries

5-5-2022

Disruption of Library Services Due to Hospital Cyberattack: A
Case Study
Alice Stokes
University of Vermont, 98astoke@uvm.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uvm.edu/libfacpub
Part of the Health Information Technology Commons, and the Health Sciences and Medical
Librarianship Commons

Recommended Citation
Stokes, Alice, "Disruption of Library Services Due to Hospital Cyberattack: A Case Study" (2022).
University Libraries Faculty and Staff Publications. 92.
https://scholarworks.uvm.edu/libfacpub/92

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University Libraries at UVM ScholarWorks. It has been
accepted for inclusion in University Libraries Faculty and Staff Publications by an authorized administrator of UVM
ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@uvm.edu.

Disruption of Library Services Due to Hospital Cyberattack: A Case
Study
Alice M. Stokes
Dana Medical Library, University of Vermont, Burlington, USA
Alice Stokes, alice.stokes@uvm.edu, Dana Medical Library, 81 Colchester Avenue,
Burlington, VT 05405, USA
Notes on contributors
Alice M Stokes, MLIS (alice.stokes@uvm.edu) is a Library Associate Professor and Research
and Education Librarian at the Dana Medical Library, University of Vermont, 81 Colchester
Avenue, Burlington, VT 05405, USA.

Disruption of Library Services Due to Hospital Cyberattack:
A Case Study
Abstract:
Cyberattacks on healthcare organizations increased dramatically in 2020 and
2021. The University of Vermont Medical Center suffered an attack in October
2020, during the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. The disruption to
hospital computer systems had wide ranging impacts, including loss of online
access to the medical library for nearly three months. Library staff worked to
reduce impacts and increase access for hospital employees until full access was
restored. This case study offers lessons learned and resources for health sciences
libraries planning for a potential cyberattack.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, healthcare systems have been a common target of cybercrimes that seek
to disrupt services and/or steal sensitive patient data for financial gain, including
ransomware attacks and data theft.1-3 Cyberattacks on healthcare organizations
increased dramatically in 2020 and 2021.4,5 It was a particularly active time for
cybercrimes in general, many of which used COVID-19 themes such as COVID-related
domain names to exploit the COVID crisis. Technological adaptations in healthcare
services and workflows during the pandemic, including a rapid pivot to telehealth and
remote work, introduced new cybersecurity risks in the hospital setting.6 At least 239
million healthcare cyberattacks were attempted in 2020, an increase of nearly 10,000%
from 2019.4 According to the Department of Health and Human Services, one of the

most noteworthy attacks in the United States in 2020 was the cyberattack on the
University of Vermont (UVM) Medical Center in October 2020.4
The University of Vermont Medical Center is an academic medical center
associated with the University of Vermont Larner College of Medicine and College of
Nursing and Health Sciences. It is the community hospital for 168,000 people and the
referral hospital for one million people in Vermont and New York.7 It is the only Level
1 Trauma Center in Vermont and houses the only children’s hospital in the state. With
620 licensed beds, the hospital employs more than 8,800 people.7
The Dana Medical Library is the health sciences library for the University of
Vermont and the University of Vermont Medical Center. Located in a concourse
between the hospital and the medical education center, it serves the University of
Vermont Medical Center, the Larner College of Medicine, the College of Nursing and
Health Sciences, and the health sciences information needs of the broader university
campus. Following the cyberattack on the UVM Medical Center, library services were
substantially disrupted for hospital employees.
Because the Dana Medical Library is part of the University of Vermont
Libraries, library systems reside on the university network. This had important
implications during the cyberattack—some positive and some negative. Hospital
libraries may be more vulnerable to complete disruption from cyberattacks than
academic health sciences libraries. However, some of Dana Medical Library’s
experiences and lessons learned should be relevant to most health sciences libraries.

CASE STUDY
About the attack

Dana Medical Library staff first heard that there might be a disruption to the network at
the UVM Medical Center on October 29, 2020, when it was reported in the news.8 The
library did not receive any notification from the hospital directly, because all computer
systems were taken offline as soon as the problem was apparent. When UVM Medical
Center Information Technology (IT) realized that there was a widespread problem, they
shut down the internet and electronic health records (EHR) system to prevent further
infiltration.9
The attack downed the phone system, cut off access to staff emails and medical
records, and slowed the hospital’s ability to provide radiation treatment and run scans.
A few hours after the attack began, a message was discovered on a network computer
that stated the data had been encrypted with information on how to contact the attackers.
There was no specific ransom note or dollar amount. Hospital IT staff immediately
contacted the FBI.9 No effort to contact the attackers was made and no ransom was
paid.10
All hospital computer systems were down for several weeks. Electronic health
records were inaccessible. Staff returned to using paper charts and many patient
appointments were canceled. Essential hospital services continued, but in the early days
of the attack only half of scheduled procedures and operations were performed.11 While
there was significant disruption to hospital services across the board, no data was
breached in the attack. During this period, UVM Medical Center furloughed and
reassigned more than 300 employees in response to the effects of the attack.12
The hospital IT team wiped all servers clean and rebuilt them, and wiped and
reimaged 5,000 laptops and computers. The Vermont National Guard Combined Cyber
Response Team was brought in to assist with this process, providing essential technical
assistance and personnel.13 It took 25 days to restore access to the electronic health

records system, and longer to fully restore all systems.14 The attack was estimated to
cost $1.5 million per day, for a total cost of at least $40 and $50 million.10, 15

What caused the attack?
Forensic analysis revealed that a hospital employee took a corporate laptop on vacation
in October 2020 and opened a personal email from their homeowner’s association that
contained a “phishing” scam.15 When the email was opened, cybercriminals deposited
malware onto the laptop. A few days later, when the employee returned to work and
connected to the hospital network, attackers were able to use the malware to launch the
network-wide attack. The hospital has since augmented its cybersecurity for all
computers and the entire network, and increased training for employees on how to spot
and avoid phishing attempts.

Library impacts
Hospital systems were down for approximately three and a half weeks, but it took
nearly three months from the start of the attack to restore access for UVM Medical
Center employees to Dana Medical Library systems (see Fig. 1)

[PLACE FIGURE 1 HERE]
LEGEND FIGURE 1. Timeline of cyberattack and recovery

The acute crisis at the hospital was resolved before Thanksgiving, but in early
December library staff discovered that hospital employees still did not have direct
remote access to the library and it took seven more weeks to get full access restored.

The hospital uses a client connector to hide hospital IP addresses from external
sites, preventing IP authentication to library resources. Under normal circumstances, a
special network connection between the hospital and the university allows the library's
proxy server to bypass that restriction and provide access. As soon as the attack was
detected, however, that special network connection was cut off. Users at the hospital
could no longer access library resources. This took much longer to troubleshoot and fix
even after the main hospital systems had been restored. It required the cooperation of
many different parties. The medical library relationship with the College of Medicine
was helpful in moving the process along.
Usual authentication methods were disrupted for most hospital employees. Like
many academic medical centers, Dana Medical Library has a mix of hospital patrons
who also have university credentials and those who only have hospital credentials. For
those who had university credentials, the disruption was minimal, as they were still able
to use the university proxy to access library materials. Those without university
credentials had no electronic access to library services. Since medical center email
addresses were not accessible for several weeks, and the hospital intranet was down,
there was no way to communicate directly with hospital employees. This disruption to
services included Interlibrary Loan (ILL), which usually uses UVM Medical Center
email addresses as one of their screening tools for ILL access.

Library response
Throughout the disruption to library services for hospital employees, the library
implemented a number of strategies.
•

Flexibility: Interlibrary Loan accepted requests from users’ personal email
accounts

•

Alternatives: The library encouraged users who had university credentials to use
them, helped users set up individual accounts for databases that allow for remote
access (e.g. UpToDate Anywhere), and encouraged patrons to physically come
into the library to use the library’s computers and internet to access resources

•

Outreach: Once hospital email was restored, library liaisons sent messages to
their departments outlining alternative access methods and resources

•

Persistence: Library staff continued to work to fully restore access to library
systems from the hospital network

DISCUSSION
Every library will have individual circumstances that determine how a hospital
cyberattack impacts them. For Dana Medical Library, there were several mitigating and
exacerbating factors. The main mitigating factor was that Dana Medical Library is part
of the university side of the academic health center, so library systems were not directly
affected. Library databases, subscriptions, servers, files, email etc. continued to operate
without disruption.
The timing of the attack also reduced the impact on clinicians, because it
happened at the beginning of the second wave of COVID-19 in Vermont. During this
time clinicians were so busy with urgent patient care that librarians observed fewer
requests for general literature, and most COVID-19 literature was open access. After an
initial closure from March-August 2020, the physical library had reopened, so users had
access to print and online collections in the library, which is adjacent to the hospital.
On the other hand, the biggest exacerbating factor was also separate systems.
The library was protected from the worst effects of the attack, but it took much longer to
restore the connection between the hospital and library because library IT systems and

services are separate. While library resources are important to hospital patrons, this was
not the top priority for the hospital administration and hospital IT department coping
with the dual crises of the cyberattack and COVID-19.
The timing of the attack also presented challenges. By the time essential hospital
computer systems had been restored, in November 2020, Vermont was fully in the
throes of the second wave of COVID-19. Library employees could not enter the hospital
to visit departments or provide other in-person communication due to COVID-19
restrictions. Fewer hospital employees were entering or even passing by the library, so
typical outreach options were reduced. Finally, difficulty in coordinating
communication between the hospital, the library IT department, and the medical school
IT department delayed the full restoration of access. If the library had been part of the
hospital structure or the college of medicine, these barriers might have been reduced.

CONCLUSION
All health sciences libraries, especially those affiliated with a hospital or healthcare
system, should be prepared for a cyberattack. Based on the Dana Medical Library’s
experiences, here are a few library-specific recommendations:
(1) Develop a cyberattack plan. Review it regularly. Reflect upon and update the
plan after any cyberattacks or cybersecurity incidents. (See resources in the
Appendix)
(2) Brainstorm alternative access options in advance of and during an attack. Some
ideas that Dana Medical Library staff generated:
(a) Ask patrons for alternative contact information and add to library
records, if possible
(b) Encourage users to set up personal accounts for databases when possible

(c) Consider keeping key text in print, even when prioritizing e-books in
your collection development plan
(d) Rethink current systems and restrictions: For example, consider
temporarily accepting article requests from personal email addresses
(3) Create a communication plan. Consider what options your library would have to
communicate with patrons if usual methods (email, intranet, etc.) were cut off.
While no institution can completely eliminate the risk of a cyberattack, preparation can
mitigate the impact on library services if one were to occur. Planning for this potential
adverse event will benefit all health sciences libraries, and particularly those affiliated
with hospitals or health systems. The author hopes that reading about this specific
cyberattack and its impacts, other libraries and librarians can reflect upon and improve
the readiness of their institution to respond to a potential attack closer to home.
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Appendix
Selected resources for healthcare cyberattack awareness, preparedness and
planning
American Hospital Association https://www.aha.org/cybersecurity
CDC https://www.cdc.gov/cpr/readiness/healthcare/documents/healthcare-organizationand-hospital-cyber-discussion-guide.pdf
HHS405(d) Aligning Health Care Industry Security Approaches
https://405d.hhs.gov/public/navigation/home
HHS Health Sector Cybersecurity Coordination Center
https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/asa/ocio/hc3/index.html
FBI https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber

